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STATISTICAL INDICATORS
A few months after the recovery in business
activity began in August 1954, we compiled a
table designed to (1) test the hypothesis that
the strength of a recovery in its early stages
depends upon the level from which it starts
PARTiii and(2) permit us to compare the strength of
the current recovery with that of earlier cycli-
cal revivals. The full table shows the percent-
age changes in each of some fifty monthly and
quarterly economic series during the first 3, 4, Staff 5,6.24 months of the revivals that began
in July 1924, November 1927, March 1933,
June 1938, October 1949, and August 1954. Reports Table1 is an abbreviated version of this com-
pilation.
A rough measure of the level from which
a recovery starts is provided by the magnitude
of the preceding contraction. To rephrase our
hypothesis, moderate contractions can be ex-
pected to give rise to moderate recoveries,
severe contractions to vigorous recoveries.
Consequently the columns in the table are ar-
ranged from left to right according to the
severity of the preceding contraction, as meas-
ured by the average percentage decline in three
indexes of business activity.' On this scale,
the 1953-1954 contraction turns out to be next
to the mildest in the list.
The recoveries in many of the series, most
notably that of the Federal Reserve index of
industrial production, rank themselves roughly
in order of the severity of the preceding con-
tractions, and the hypothesis underlying the
table is substantially supported. The effect
appears during the first few months of the re-
covery and persists for some time, although it
can, of course, be upset by developments pe-
culiar to the recovery. The most notable ex-
ample of this in our table is the effect of the
Korean War, which began in June 1950 after
'This is an extension of the method used by Arthur
F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell in Measuring Busi-
ness Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research,
1946), Table 156. The three indexes are American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., Ayres (Cleveland
Trust Co.), and Persons-Barrons, and are adjusted for
long-term trend.the 1949 recovery had been under way for
some eight months. The first six months (Oc-
tober 1949-April 1950) produced increases
comparable to those in other recoveries from
TABLE 1
mild contractions. But the increases registered
for the first fifteen months (to January 1951)
are well above most of the other entries in the
table.
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN SELECTED ECONOMIC SERIES AFTER BUSINESS CYCLE TROUGHS,
ARRAYED ACCORDING TO AMPLITUDE OF PRECEDING BUSINESS CYCLE CONTRACTION,
1927-1955
FIRST SIX MONTHS AFTER THE TROUGH
Nov. 1927Aug. 1954Oct. 1949July 1924June 1938Mar. 1933
to to to to to to
May1928Feb.1955Apr.1950Jan.1925Dec.1938Sept.1933
1.Nonagricultural employment +0.9 +2.0 +4.2 +11.3
2.Industrial production +4.0 +8.1 + 10.4 +17.1 +22.7 +40.0
3.Gross nationaiproducta —0.7 +4.6 +8.0 +10.0 •+8.7 +11.4
4.Personal income +0.7 +2.1 +7.0 +6.3 +4.0 +11.2
5.Retail sales 0 +3.9 +4.1 0 +8.6 +13.6
6.Wholesale prices —0.4 +1.1 +0.8 +3.8 —1.4 +15.8
7.Industrial stock prices +12.3 + 18.3 + 14.4 +23.2 +20.5 +66.1
FIRST FIFTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE TROUGH
Nov. 1927Aug. 1954Oct. 1949July 1924June 1938Mar. 1933
to to to to to to
Feb. 1929Nov. 1955Jan. 1951Oct. 1925Sept. 1939June 1934
1.Nonagricultural employment +4.4 +9.1 +7.6 + 17.4
2.Industrial production +16.0 +17.1 +27.1 +19.5 +40.9 +40.0
3.Grossnationaiproducta +11.9 +10.7 +25.0 +16.2 +12.0 +23.5
4.Personal income +10.2 +8.6 +19.8 +12.0 +9.9 +23.5
5.Retail sales +2.7 +11.2 +24.0 +11.8 +16.2 +18.2
6.Wholesale prices —1.5 +4.4 +16.6 +5.1 +0.9 +19.0
7.Industrialstockprices +60.5 +37.5 +31.5 +52.6 +15.2 +60.2
FIRST TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE TROUGH
Nov. 1927Aug. 1954Oct. 1949July 1924June 1938Mar. 1933
to to to to to to








+ 12.0 +22.9 +24.4 +50.0 +50.0
+10.6 +31.6 +14.7 +20.5 +27.5
4.Personal income +9.3 +28.3 +13.2 +14.5 +3 1.7
5.Retail sales +2.7 +17.0 +8.8 +25.2 +31.8
6.Wholesale prices —2.7 +14.6 +1.7 +1.0 +17.7
7.Industrial stock prices +18.5 +45.1 +58.9 6.0 +67.0
a Changes are measured over the first two, first five, and first eight quarters after the quarterly business cycle
trough.
Note: The base for each percentage change is the three-month average centered on the trough month of the
business cycle. All series except 6 and 7 are adjusted for seasonal variation. The percentage amplitudes of the
preceding contractions (see text)are:Oct. 1926-Nov. 1927 —9;July 1953-Aug. 1954 —14;Nov. 1948-






Bureau of Labor Statistics; data not available before 1929.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
4 Unpublished estimates by Harold Barger and Lawrence Klein through 1940; Department of Commerce
estimates thereafter.
Department store sales before 1938, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; sales of all
retail stores from 1939, Department of Commerce.
6Bureau of Labor Statistics; excluding farm products and foods.
7Dow-Jones Co., Inc.
26The pace of the current recovery has been
more or less what one would expect in view of
the mild decline in business activity that pre-
ceded it.That is to say, the percentage rates
of increase in such measures of aggregate ac-
tivity as gross national product have been
moderate. This statement may seem surpris-
ing since the increases exceeded most pub-
lished predictions and have given rise to de-
scriptions of the current expansion as "un-
precedented." Although certain aspects of the
current expansion are, undoubtedly unprece-
dented, this is not true of the rate of increase in
output, employment, or income. Economic
experience in previous cyclical recoveries ap-
parently can help us to evaluate current ex-
perience and to formulate sound judgments
about future prospects.
Of course, the character of a cyclical ex-
pansion is not wholly dependent on what has
happened in the previous contraction. Nor do
expansions maintain their pace indefinitely.
Almost all of the economic measures shown
in the table are substantially higher at the end
of fifteen than at the end of six months. But a
comparison of the last two panels of the table
tells a different story.In the 1927 recovery,
the increases for the first twenty-four months
(November 1927-November 1929) are lower
than those for the first fifteen (November
1927-February 1929). By November 1929,
the general business contraction was already
under way.In the 1949-1951 and 1924-
1926 recoveries, some twenty-four-month in-
creases are smaller, and others not 'much
larger, than the fifteen-month increases —in-
dicating a decline or markedly reduced rate of
growth in the interval. Only in the 193 3-1935
and 1938-1940 recoveries were there substan-
tial increases between the first fifteen and the
first twenty-four months. Even these increases
did not match the rates attained during the
first six months. Rather surprisingly, in none
of the five recoveries was the advance in whole-
sale prices appreciably greater at the end of
twenty-four months than at the end of fifteen
—infour instances prices declined in this
interval.
Work has continued on the compilation and
analysis of diffusion indexes, on the interpre-
tation of the behavior of particular economic
indicators, and on the extension of our busi-
ness cycle chronology. A paper of mine pre-
senting some new results on diffusion indexes
was published in the October 1955 issue of
The American Statistician, under the title,
"Diffusion Indexes: A Comment." Victor Zar-
nowitz presented a paper at the December
1955 meetings of the American Statistical As-
sociation on "Manufacturers' Orders as Indi-
cators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions,"
and is revising it for possible publication as an
Occasional Paper.Alexander Pitts has ex-
tended the business cycle chronology to 1954.
The peak and trough dates are:
Monthly Quarterly
TroughOctober 1949IV 1949









During 1956, we are planning to prepare a
volume on business cycle indicators, which
will bring together papers published in recent
years, include new papers, and provide histori-




Seasonally corrected time series often seem to
show waves too short, or too slight, or both,
to be called specific cycles, yet too persistent
to attribute to causes that the economist can
afford to ignore.In the shoe, leather, hide
industry, the cause of these "subcycles," which
average about a year and a half in duration,
became fairly evident in the course of our
studies. There is every reason to suppose that
the basic factors that generated subcycles in
the shoe, leather, hide sequence operate in
other industries too, though in different com-
binations and proportions.
But, whatever the cause of subcycles in a
particular industry, their economic significance
will differ depending on whether or not they
27tend to occur at roughly the same time in a
wide variety of activities over a long stretch
of years. To determine whether this general
confluence was present, I selected thirty-three
time series that cover a long period. These in-
clude the major general series having a broad
economic coverage (composite general indi-
cators were purposely avoided) as well as ac-
tivity in many important industries. The list
includes fourteen series on the output of in-
vestment goods as well as of consumption
goods, six on financial markets, and thirteen
nonagricultural price series.If specific sub-
cycles are found to occur at more or less the
same time in these data, such times, if they
also accord with other information, may be
tentatively designated as subcycles in the econ-
omy at large and used as a reference frame for
further study.
Accordingly, for the years 1875 through
1941, specific subcycles were marked inde-
pendently in each series. How a subcycle was
identified is discussed in Chapter 4 of my
Consumption and Business Fluctuations: A
Case Study of the Shoe, Leather, Hide Se-
quence. For each month, in effect, the number
of series in a contraction phase was subtracted
from the number in an expansion phase. The
net number of series expanding each month
was cumulated. 'The operations were per-
formed for each of four subdivisions and for
all thirty-three series together.These con-
structed time series provided the backbone
for the selection of periods when business ac-
tivity seemed to be experiencing sufficiently
general rises or falls to warrant their tentative
inclusion in a reference subcycle scheme.
Information about the intensity of move-
ments of broad aggregates and other pertinent
information were also used. For the period
1921 to 1941, selections based primarily on
these thirty-three series could be checked by
recourse to a far richer collection of time
series. These data pointed to the same sub-
cycles with only slight modification of peak
and trough dates. The more plentiful mate-
rials will also be used to extend the chronology
through 1955.
Between March 1879 and June 1938, 16
28
business cycles have been identified; they aver-
age 46 months in duration.From August
1876 to April 1940, I identify 21 additional
waves.If all of the waves are counted —37
in all —theyhave an average duration of 20.7
months.Individual variationis wide; sub-
cycles run from 54 to 8 months in duration;
their median duration is 18 months. Expan-
sions, as in business cycles, tend to be longer
than contractions.
The selection of this series of dates has two
objectives. The first, as indicated, is to reveal
whether there appear to be times when move-
ments too short, or too weak, or both, to be
designated business cycles occurred in many
activities at roughly the same time.
The second is to provide a tool for the ex-
amination of how various industries or various
sorts of economic functions or aspects (output,
prices, shipments, orders, stocks) participate in
these movements. Such information is neces-
sary to give meaning to the phenomenon of an
economic subcycle. For the strength and dif-
fusion of fluctuation in business as a whole is
a matter of degree. When a sufficient number
of industries or aspects of economic life have
specific subcycles of specified intensities at
roughly the same time, the episode is desig-
nated a subcycle. Thus the marginal "refer-
ence subcycle" is defined in terms of this just
sufficientparticipation —anarbitrary judg-
ment at best. The information concerning par-
ticipation will further provide a few rough
clues to the cause of specific and general sub-
cyclical fluctuation and its relationship to the
phenomenon of business cycles.During the
year, I expect to prepare a few short papers




Last year we reported on preliminary efforts to
use the Dun and Bradstreet surveys of busi-
nessmen's expectations to forecast changes in
such economic aggregates as sales, employ-
ment, and inventories of manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers. Though the scheme usedwas primitive and was based on relationships
obtaining in the pre-recession period 1949-
1952, it seemed desirable to advance the fore-
casts on the basis of each new survey without
revising the basic relationships to take account
of more current data. In this way we hoped
that any deficiencies of the method and of the
underlying theory of the relationship between
diffusion data and aggregate change would be
brought sharply to light.
The main deficiency disclosed is a tendency
for the estimated changes to run too high. This
tendency affects all variables. But it is most
glaring in the case of inventories and led to
forecasts that failed to disclose any inventory
liquidation in the recession period 1953-1954.
At the same time, the fluctuations in the higher
predicted rates of change roughly parallel cor-
responding fluctuations in the actual rates as
disclosed in the estimates of the Department
of Commerce.
Of the various hypotheses that might be ad-
vanced to account for this bias, we have con-
sidered three: (1) the period analyzed, em-
bracing as it does the Korean reconversion
crisis, is atypical of normal relations between
expectations and subsequent outcomes; (2)
the model used to relate diffusion data, actual
and expected, to aggregate change is too rigid;
and (3) the use of diffusion data as a sensitive
index of aggregate change requires that the
individual reports of directions of change be
weighted by a relevant measure of firm size.
Concerning thefirst, we have achieved
marked improvements in forecasting the level
of estimated changes by using moving regres-
sion relations. The regressions are based on a
fixed number of the most recent surveys and
so are revised continuously in a manner anal-
ogous to the variation in a regular moving
average. An interesting by-product of the
process is the fact that in each succeeding re-
gression, the quantitative effect of a given
change in expectations on realized aggregate
change is increased. Thus while expectations
moved more sharply in the Korean period than
they have since, they were associated with pro-
portionately smaller changes in inventories.
This fact suggests that there was considerable
disappointment of businessmen's expectations
during both the 1950 rise in activity and the
subsequent decline in 1951. This tendency is
clearest for inventories, and likewise easiest to
understand; but it appears to have affected
other economic variables as well.
Several of our results also throw light on the
second hypothesis. We have at times improved
our forecasts by adding variables to our model,
for example, the recent change in the aggre-
gate to be forecast. We have also found
cases where expectations of rise and expecta-
tions of fall do not appear to be related to the
aggregate change in a symmetrical fashion.
And finally, there is evidence to suggest that
the relation of diffusion data to aggregate
change may not be linear. Evidence on this
last point is mainly theoretical and is clearest
in the case of weighted diffusion data. It will
therefore need to be taken into account in our
efforts to evaluate the third explanatory hy-
pothesis mentioned above.
The argument for weighting diffusion data
by a measure of firm size scarcely admits of
serious opposition. Such weighting has been
employed with success by the IFO-Institute
for Economic Research of Munich, Germany,
and it gets strong support from the well-nigh
universal finding that the expectations of large
firms tend to be more accurate than those of
small.
Fortunately, we shall now be able to in-
vestigate this question for the Dun and Brad-
street data directly, for we have been granted
permission to work with the punched-card ifie
of individual-firm reports submitted in the ex-
pectations surveys from mid-1952 to date.
These records are coded to conceal the iden-
tities of individual firms, but they are classi-
fiable by industry and by various measures of
firm size —inparticular, by tangible net worth
and in some cases by total sales. Besides pro-
viding the necessary data for constructing dif-
fusion indexes of expectations weighted by the
importance of the reporting firm, these records
will (1) permit a rough test of the consistency
of individual-firm expectations about related
variables, (2) facilitate a study of the factors
influencing the formation of expectations, and
29(3) make possible an investigation of fore-
casting success as a function of firm size.
Also the Dun and Bradstreet questionnaire
is now including a new pair of questions on
manufacturers' new orders. The first question,
introduced in the June 1955 survey, calls for
new order information that compares expected
orders two quarters hence with actual orders
in the quarter just concluded, rather than with
the corresponding quarter a year earlier, as
hitherto. The second, introduced in the Janu-
ary 1956 survey, asks for corresponding in-
formation on the actual trend of new orders
during the two quarters just closed when the
survey is taken. Table 2 summarizes the re-
suits to date and includes corresponding results
on the standard four-quarter basis.
TABLE 2
Though experience with the new questions
is limited, the following points aheady stand
out:
1. In the four surveys to date, manufac-
turers have been less optimistic about new
order prospects on a two-quarter basis than on
the four-quarter basis terminating in the same
quarter. Apparently, in each survey, a number
of respondents felt that in the previous two
quarters they had already experienced the full
increase in new orders to be expected in the
four-quarter period covered by the standard
question. So they expressed this fact by shift-
ing their expectations for the remaining two
quarters to "no change" or "decrease." The
correctness of this shift cannot be tested for
all four surveys. But such a shift accords with
COMPARISON OF TWO-QUARTER WITH FOUR-QUARTER SURVEYS OF BUSINESSMEN'S EXPECTATIONS,
1955AND1956
EXPECTED CHANGES IN NEW ORDERS ACTUAL CHANGES IN NEW ORDERS
. June 1955 Sept. 1955Jan. 1956 April 1956 Jan. 1956 April 1956
Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey
IV 54- 1155-155- 111 55-1155- IV 55- III 55- 156- IV 54- 1155-155- III 55-
IV 55 IV 5515615611561156 11156 11156 IV 55 IV 55156156
All manufacturers:
Numberof firms 505493630615675658708682 713689728715
Percentage expecting:
Increase 7362615264505650 73 61 68 53
No change 2422363833384139 22262730
Decrease 316 310 312 3 11 5 13 5 17
Net percentage
expecting increase 7046584261385339 68486336
Durable goods
manufacturers:
Number of firms 265260304298314310365355 328321376371
Percentage expecting:
Increase 7260605469545649 77607458
No change 2423383628383937 17252026
Decrease 4 17 2 10 3 8 5 14 6 15 6 16
Net percentage
expecting increase 6843584466465135 71456842
Nondurable goods
manufacturers:
Number of firms 240233326317361348343327 385368352344
Percentage expecting:
Increase 7565625159475551 7063 6148
No change 2321354037374341 25263435
Decrease 2 14 3 9 4 16 2 8 5 11 5 17
Net percentage
expecting increase 73 5159425531 53 43 65 52 56 31
Source: Dun and Bradstreet,
30
Inc.the general impression that the recent boom
has been leveling off since the middle of 1955,
and the two reports so far available on actual
changes in new orders (see the surveys of
January and April 1956) show the same shift
from a four-quarter to a two-quarter basis.
2. The figures obtained on two-quarter ac-
tual changes in the January and April surveys
this year confirm fairly well the corresponding
two-quarter expected changes obtained in the
June and September surveys of 1955. In fact,
the two-quarter expectations are not notably
less accurate than those for four quarters. The
poorest forecasts on both bases were made in
the September 1955 survey; compared with
outcomes reported in the April 1956 survey,
the four-quarter expectations of durable goods
manufacturers were substantially too low, while
the two-quarter expectations of nondurable
goods manufacturers were about as much too
high.That the two-quarter forecasts should
compare so favorably with those for four
quarters is somewhat surprising, for the former
represent genuine forecasts whereas the latter
concern a period that is half over at the time
the expectations are formed and might there-
fore be expected to have greater accuracy. The
result is the more striking in that the sample
of firms reporting expectations has almost no
firms in common with the subsequent sample
reporting actual changes.
3. A somewhat more discriminating ap-
praisal results from comparing shifts in busi-
ness sentiment between successive surveys with
corresponding shifts in actual outcomes. Be-
tween the June and September 1955 surveys,
both two- and four-quarter expectations wors-
ened. Compared with the actual change in
conditions as revealed in the January and April
1956 surveys, the shift in four-quarter ex-
pectations was excessive, whereas the shift in
two-quarter expectations fellshort.More-
over, the insufficiency of the two-quarter shift
in expectations reflects a contradictory migra-
tion of firms into the no-change category from
both the rising and faffing categories.This
contradiction is not borne out by the shift in
actual two-quarter experience, which shows
the normal situation of a decrease in rising
firms together with an increase in falling firms.
4. One systematic discrepancy between two-
and four-quarter expectations is puzzling. On
our usual convention of dating the expectation
associated with a given interval at the midpoint
of that interval, one would expect substantial
agreement between the two-quarter expecta-
tions (or actuals) of one survey and the four-
quarter expectations (or actuals) of its im-
mediate successor. For example, the expecta-
tions for the interval IV 1955-Il 1956 would
be centered in the first quarter of 1956, and
so would the subsequent expectations for the
interval III 1955-Ill 1956.The presumed
agreement, however, is missing. In every one
of the three comparisons that can be made,
the two-quarter expectations tend to be lower
than the corresponding four-quarter expecta-
tions, and in fact are invariably lower on a
net basis. Moreover, this tendency is borne
out in the one comparison of actual experience
that can be made —thatfor two-quarter ac-
tual changes in the interval II 1955-IV 1955
with the four-quarter actual changes in the
interval I1955-I 1956.Careful study of
Table 2 does not reveal any pattern of devel-
opments over the period since last June to
suggest that two-quarter prospects should have
been appraised in a less favorable light than
those for four quarters, nor does the like tend-
ency of the actuals allow us to believe that we
are dealing with a purely expectational bias.
The possibility that seasonal factors may be
involved must of course be considered for two-
quarter diffusion data. But these would not be
expected to produce discrepancies in the same
direction in three successive comparisons of
two- and four-quarter expectations. Besides,
the expectations concern new orders, which in
general do not disclose a sufficiently syste-
matic seasonal component to require seasonal
adjustment. For the present, therefore, we in-
cline to the view that the smoothing involved
in four-quarter comparisons submerges erratic
factors more effectively than that involved in
two-quarter comparisons, and thus that four-
quarter diffusion indexes tend to have the
31greater amplitude. Since our data cover only
the leveling off phase of a period of expansion,
two-quarter indexes can be expected to run
lower than four-quarter ones.
COSTS AND PROFITS
MILLARD HASTAY
Labor cost per unit of product. The num-
ber of man-hours of work that must be paid
for per unit of product is an important factor
in cost. Annual indexes of man-hours per unit
of product are available for many industries,
especially for manufacturing industries be-
tween 1919 and 1950. We analyzed the
changes that occurred in each industry during
each expansion or contraction in its produc-
tion (for which we have data). Better plant,
equipment, and processes reduced input per
unit in most expansions and in most contrac-
tions. Man-hours per unit, however, increased
in 45 per cent of the contractions but in only
45 per cent of the expansions. A conformity
index of —42, based on the rates of change in
input per unit in all industries in all cycles of
output, indicates that the decline in unit re-
quirements during expansions was faster than
the decline, if any, during contractions. These
figures suggest that, in the absence of tech-
nological improvement, man-hours per unit
would typically decline in expansions and rise
in contractions.
In computing the general conformity index,
TABLE 3
we included observations for industries where
we have information for only one or two cycles
in output. We also computed indexes for in-
dividual industries where we had data for eight
or more successive phases of output. Sixteen
industries had conformity indexes somewhere
between —100 and —26, seven industries had
indexes between —25 and +25, and only one
had a positive index of +26 or higher.
Although input per unit was usually smaller
in the last year of an expansion than in the
first, and larger in the last year of a contraction
than in the first, the direction of change may
not have been uniform throughout either
kind of period. Accordingly, we constructed
monthly estimates of man-hours per unit of
product for the cement industry and the steel
industry. Data on the direction of change in
these and in two industries previously studied
are summarized in Table 3. Declines in man-
hours per unit predominated in all segments
of expansion, and rises, in all segments of con-
traction. The predominance was smaller, how-
ever, in the last segment than in the earlier
ones.
The foregoing conclusions, among others,
were presented in a paper I read at a joint
meeting of the American Economic Associa-
tion and the American Statistical Association
in December. We are now investigating
monthly changes in other industries. A survey
of available monthly data on man-hours and
output, however, indicated that there are many
NUMBER OF CHANGES IN MAN-HOURS PER UNIT FROM STAGE TO STAGE OF






















































































































a In one cycle, input per unit did not change from VII to VIII.
Note: For a description of cycle stages, see Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946, p. 29.
32for which measures of man-hours per unit
cannot be constructed without gross statistical
indiscretion.
Cost and profit per dollar of sales or invest-
ment. A manuscript dealing with these ratios
in eight major industries or groups of indus-
tries was completed. Expense ratios most often
fluctuated inversely, and profit ratios directly,
with sales (Table 4). The turnover of capital
followed sales more closely than profit mar-
gins did, and return on net worth consequently
was more closely related to sales than margins
were. Changes in taxes on income and on ex-
cessprofitsoccasionally caused aggregate
profits, margins, and rates of return to change
in one direction while the corresponding items,
before taxes, changed in the opposite direction.
Exceptions to the generalizations suggested by
the table occurred mostly during the World
War II, the period of price dislocation that
followed, and the period of defense effort be-
ginning in 1950.
The manuscript shows that profits of cor-
porations manufacturing durables fluctuate
more than those of corporations making non-
durables, as might be expected. In a separate
project, we are trying to analyze differences
in profit experience among manufacturing in-
dustries and some mining industries in much
greater detail. Each business expansion and
contraction will be considered separately.
Profits and the stock market. Two new
analyses confirm our previously reported con-
clusion that there islittle relation between
short-term changes in a company's earnings
and short-term changes in the market value of
TABLE 4
YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES IN VARIOUS COST AND PRoFIT AGGREGATES OR RATIOS,
CLASSIFIED AccolmING TO DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN AGGREGATE SALES,
EIGHT INDUSTRIES, 1919-1954
Percentage of Observations
in Which Direction of Change





Operating expenses" 95 5
Overhead expensesb 79 21
Total expenses 97 3
Profits before tax 82 18
Profits after tax 79 21
Net worth 71 29
Ratio to sales of:
Operating expenses 36 64
Overhead expenses 27 73
Total expenses 29 71
Profits before tax' 70 30
Profits after taxc 65 35
Ratio to net worth of:
Sales 81 19
Profits before tax 74 26
Profits after tax 70 30
a Labor,materials, etc.
bDepreciation,property taxes, interest, etc.
CIncludessome profits not derived from sales.
Note: Industries: manufacture of durables, 1919-1953; manufacture of nondurables,
1919-1953; trade, 1922-1952; construction, 1932-1952; railroads, 1919-1954; electric
utilities, 1926-1953; gas companies, 1937-1953; Bell telephone system, 1920-1954. Some
items were not available for some years.
33its common stock. Our former analysis was
made on a simultaneous plan. The change in
a company's profits from the first quarter of
1928 to the second, for example, was com-
pared with the change in value between the
same two quarters.
In one of our new analyses, the change in
earnings from the first quarter to the second
is compared with the change in value from the
second to the third, on the theory that the
market does not react to the change in profits
until the earnings report is published. In the
other analysis, the change in value from the
first quarter to the second is compared with
the change in profits from the second to the
third, on the theory that the market anticipates
changes in earnings.
The correlation between profit changes and
price changes indicated by either of these sys-
tems of comparison is even weaker than the
correlation indicated by the simultaneous sys-
tem.Dissimilar changes (profits up, value
TABLE 5
down; or profits down, value up) are almost as
frequent as similar changes under all three
systems.
But longer, more persistent changes in
profits arereflectedin prices.This becomes
clear when an intermediate quarter of a busi-
ness expansion or contraction is compared
with a more or less remote terminal quarter
(Table 5). From the third quarter of 1931 to
the first quarter of 1933, for example, the
stocks of nine companies with rising profits
declined, on the average, 36 per cent. Their
rising profits did not cause the price of their
stocks to go up in the face of the generally
deepening economic gloom; but the stocks of
forty-five companies with diminishing profits
declined much more; they fell, on the average,
53 per cent.
In deciding what prices to pay or accept,
buyers and sellers of stocks are influenced by
dividends as well as earnings, and dividends
often are stationary while earnings fluctuate;
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MARKET VALUE OF COMMON STOCKS OF CORPORATIONS
WITH EXPANDING PROFITS, AND CORPORATIONS WITH CONTRACTING PROFITS,
DURING 1929-193 3 BUSINESS CONTRACTION
FROM DATE INDICATED TO I 1933,
COMPANIES WITH:
FROM II 1929 TO DATE INDICATED,
COMPANIES WITH:
EXPANDING PROFITSCONTRACTING PROFITS EXPANDING PROFITS CONTRACTING PROFITS
Companies Change Companies ChangeCompanies Change Companies Change
QUARTER(number) (per cent) (number) (per cent)(number) (per cent) (number) (per cent)
II 1929 0
1111929 0 86 9 98 1
IV 1929 0 67 —17 98 —31
11930 0 25 —10 86 —28
111930 0 13 —10 84 —31
III 1930 1 —60 38 —73 9 —16 81 —45
IV 1930 4 —41 38 —66 7 —25 77 —60
I 1931 4 —46 40 —66 5 118 71 —57
111931 6 —32 44 —60 3 —2 71 —67
III 1931 9 —36 45 —53 2 —4 63 —71
IV 1931 29 —24 49 —34 1 —31 61 —79
11932 38 —16 49 —26 0
111932 62 33 57 11 0
III 1932 81 —16 58 —18 0
IV 1932 111 —11 59 —9 0
11933 0
Note: Similar information is available for business contractions and expansions from 1920-1921 to 1937-1938;
the statistical base, however, is thin in earliest years.
34sometimes dividend payments and profits
change in opposite directions. We are there-
fore planning to collect dividend data corres-
ponding to our profits data, and to take ac-




The long-term goal of the present study is to
analyze the cyclical behavior of the labor mar-
ket. Employment and hours, labor turnover,
payrolls and earnings, labor productivity, and
labor costs all must be considered in a syste-
maticanalysisof labor market activities.
Work during the past year was almost entirely
concentrated on the physical aspects of labor
input: hours, employment, and labor turnover.
Hours and employment. The analysis of
average hours worked per week and of employ-
ment was based on monthly National Indus-
trial Conference Board data for the interwar
period and on Bureau of Labor Statistics data
from 1932 on.
In making the seasonal adjustment of the
postwar data, we had an opportunity to ex-
periment with data processing by large scale
electronic computers, such as the Univac. We
used an early program, developed by Julius
Shiskin at the Bureau of the Census. The pro-
cedure was time-saving and, on the whole,
produced good results at low cost. Some addi-
tional work by hand calculator proved neces-
sary, but refinements in the program have re-
duced the number of such corrections required.
Some preliminary findings follow:
1. The long-term downward trend in the
length of the work week of the first four
decades of the century was not pronounced
during recent postwar years. In manufactur-
ing, hours, on the average, remained almost
the same. In nonmanufacturing, some indus-
tries showed a substantial reduction in hours
(coal mining, railroads, and so forth) but the
tendency was far from universal.
2. Cyclically, hours showed widely diverg-
ing patterns both in size of swing and in con-
formity to changes in business activity. Cyc-
lical amplitudes ranged from fractions of an
hour (wholesale trade) to four, five, or more
hours (primary metals, textile mill products,
coal mining).
3. Fluctuations in hours were smaller than
in employment —formanufacturing, perhaps
half as large. Industries with larger than aver-
age employment variations tended to show
greater fluctuations in hours.
4. In general, the larger the employment
amplitude, the smaller the variation in total
man-hours accounted for by fluctuations in
the length of the work week. Custom limits
fluctuation in hours, so that, in comparison
with changes in employment, changes in hours
tended to be smaller in deep contractions than
in mild ones, in durables than in nondurables,
in producer than in consumer goods.
5. The lead of average weekly hours over
employment and over turns in general business
activity appeared both in industry as a whole
and in every one of the thirty manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing industries examined so
far, though not invariably for every turn or
cycle.
Labor turnover.Completed analyses of
gross accession, gross separation, quit, dis-
charge, lay-off, and net accession rates for
total manufacturing were available from 1919
on. For the period after World War II, we
added labor turnover rates for total durables
and nondurables and for petro1eurti and coal
products (with relatively low turnover and
mild cycles) and for transportation equipment
(with relatively high turnover and more pro-
nounced cycles). These data should help us
see how useful labor market turnover rates are
for gaining an understanding of the dynamics
of labor input. We can report only tentative
findings:
1. Labor turnover rates vary widely among
industries. In 1954, for example, the monthly
separation rate for petroleum and coal prod-
ucts averaged about 1.1 per cent of employ-
ment, that for transportation equipment, 4.6
per cent. The differences between "minor in-
dustries" can be appreciably larger. Thus the
35separation rate for petroleum refining was only
0.7 per cent per month, that for shipbuilding,
as high as 12.5 per cent.
2. There is also considerable diversity in
the amplitudes of labor turnover rates. During
recent postwar cycles, average monthly separa-
tion rates in petroleum and coal products
varied cyclically, both during expansions and
during contractions, by about 0.8 per cent of
employment (around an average level of about
1.2 per cent for the period). The comparable
variation for transportation equipment was 4
per cent (around an average level of approxi-
mately 5 per cent).Measures of relative
amplitude, in terms of percentage changes in
turnover rates, show that separation rates in
both industries varied cyclically by about 70
or 80 per cent of their average levels. A rela-
tion between levels and amplitudes of separa-
tion rates is suggested by these figures.
3. Labor turnover rates (specifically total
accession, total separation, and quit rates)
showed distinct downward trends during the
1920's and during the post-World War II
period. Both periods were characterized by
sustained high employment. However, insti-
tutional developments, likeseniorityrules,
pension funds, and subsidized unemployment
benefits, must also be considered in any analy-
sis of this tendency.
4. Voluntary quit rates rose and fell with
employment, showed distinct leads at peaks,
but no similarly distinct timing relations at
troughs. Workers evidently respond quickly
to early signs of a softening labor market. But
at business cycle troughs, early signs of in-
creased demand for labor did not lead imme-
diately to increased quitting. At this stage of
the cycle, labor input is increased primarily
by changes in average hours, rehiring of recent
lay-offs, and hiring of the unemployed. Also
the substantial lags in wage rates suggest that
monetary inducements to change jobs are rela-
tively weak in this phase.
5. Lay-off rates showed inverse cyclical
conformity and tended to exhibit long leads
at both peaks and troughs.
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GERHARD BRY
INVENTORY CYCLES SINCE 1938
The purpose of the present study is to make a
systematic analysis of available manufacturers'
sales and inventory data for the period 1939-
1954. The investigation is being carried out
within the general framework of hypotheses
and methods used by Moses Abramovitz in his
Inventories and Business Cycles, with Special
Reference to Manufacturers' Inventories.1 The
principal data to be analyzed are:
1. Monthly inventory and sales series (Of-
ficeof Business Administration, two-
digit industry classification, since 1939)
2. Individual commodity stocks and ship-
ments series (Abramovitz' series or com-
parable ones)
3. Monthly inventory by stage of fabrica-
tion series (OBE, unpublished, restric-
tions on publication, two-digit industry
classffication)
Other data to be examined for possible rele-
vance are:
4. Annual data on book value of inven-
tories by stage of fabrication (Bureau of
the Census, three-digit and certain four-
digit industry classifications, 1947 and
1949-1953)
5. Quarterly inventory data (Securities and
ExchangeCommissionandFederal
Trade Commission, two-digit industry
classification)
6. Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders
series (OBE, certain two-digit industry
classifications, since January 1948)
The study thus far reveals that, although
stocks are somewhat smaller than prewar in
relation to the total volume of business, post-
war movements in business inventories have
played an important role in cyclical disturb-
ances. Changes in business inventories (i.e.
business inventory investment) have varied
widely, sometimes contributing to, sometimes
dampening, cyclical instability.Changes in
the rate of inventory investment have been
relatively large in the early stages of both
1NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1950.contraction and expansion, larger in the con-
traction phases.
During the first two quarters of the recession
of 1.949, decreases in inventory investment ac-
counted for 82 per cent of the decline in gross
national product. During a similar period of
the 1953-1954 recession, decreases in inven-
tory investment actually exceeded the decline
in gross national product by 5 per cent. Dur-
ing the first two quarters of the expansions that
began in late 1949 and 1954, increases in in-
ventory investment were 56 per cent and 42
per cent of increases in gross national product.
Preliminary analysis of quarterly data indi-
cates that manufacturers' total inventories have
moved with less lag than Abramovitz's findings
indicated for the prewar period. Both deflated
and book value series demonstrated a maxi-
mum lag of one quarter behind business cycle
turns during the decade 1945 to 1955.
The behavior of inventory investment also
differed somewhat from that described by
Abramovitz. During both expansion periods
of the two postwar cycles, total manufac-
turers' inventory investment reached its peak
very early, more than two years prior to busi-
ness cycle peaks. An additional cycle in inven-
tory investment was noted in each instance,
however, with peaks occurring at dates roughly
coincident with business cycle peaks. During
the two brief recessions since 1945, inventory
investment troughs coincided with business
cycle troughs. Movements in inventory series
for major industry groups showed similar be-
havior.Turning points in total manufactur-
ers' inventory investment have lagged turning
points in rates of change in industry activity
with a sufficient degree of consistency to sug-
gest that the relationship between first differ-
ences in levels of stocks and in output or
shipments should be carefully explored at the
industry level.
During the months ahead, a more refined
analysis will be carried out. Present plans call
for the preparation of a manuscript by June
1956 covering the findings of the study.
T. M. STANBACK, JR.
MONEY AND BANKING
A volume is in preparation on the estimates
of the money stock compiled by Anna J.
Schwartz and summarized in last year's an-
nual report. The first part of the volume will
analyze the secular and cyclical behavior of
the money stock; the second part will describe
the methods of estimation and present some
of the basic data used. I hope the volume will
be completed during 1956.
A more intensive analysis of the role of
monetary factors in the United States since
1875 is continuing.Phillip Cagan has been
working on the factors determining the supply
of money in an attempt to isolate the separate
influence of changes in (1) the gold stock, (2)
Treasury or Federal Reserve creation of cur-
rency and Reserve Bank deposits, (3) the re-
serve policy of banks, and (4) the form in
which the public holds its money. A parallel
study of the factors determining the demand
for money balances is planned.
These monetary studies are being carried on
in cooperation with the Workshop in Money
and Banking of the University of Chicago. The
Workshop has been continuing its study of the
relative accuracy of the quantity theory of
money and the income-expenditure theory in
predicting short-run changes in income and
prices.It has recently started an analysis of
some monetary episodes to find out how far
monetary changes can be regarded as auton-
omous.
The mutually supporting character of the
Workshop's and the National Bureau's mone-
tary studies is well brought out by a volume
tentatively entitled, "Studies in the Quantity
Theory of Money" which is being published
by the University of Chicago Press under the
auspices of the Workshop. This volume con-
tains papers by Phillip Cagan, John Klein,
Eugene M. Lerner, and Richard Selden, and
an introduction by me. These papers present
an analytical framework for the analysis of
demand mentioned in the second paragraph,




I have been measuring and analyzing the cycli-
cal variations of manufacturing employment in
thirty-three states during three business cycles.
The cycles are identified with the following
periods of business contraction and expansion:
1919-1921-1923, 1929-1933-1937, and 1948-
1950-1953. The dates conform approximately
to years of peaks and troughs in business ac-
tivity.Data on manufacturing employment
for the first two cycles are annual averages
taken from the censuses of manufactures for
the respective years. Data for the third cycle
are monthly averages from the Bureauof
Labor Statistics series, with peaks and troughs
identified through the use of twelve-month
moving totals.
A fourth cycle was introduced, which over-
laps with the first —withan expansion from
1914 to 1919 and a contraction from 1919 to
1921. The use of 1919 as a proxy for a peak
year, in the absence of data for 1918 or 1920,
does not do much violence to the facts because
the rise between 1914 and 1919 is far greater
than either the 1918-1919 contraction or the
1919-1920 expansion.
I hope to discover whether there is any re-
lation between the growth and decline of states
and the amplitude of the cyclical swing they
experience.In general, I expect to find the
widest cyclical swings in declining economic
regions.
A declining region contains workers who
have not yet migrated to areas with growing
per capita real income.It also contains idle
plant capacity.It can thus adjust to cyclical
expansions of demand more easily than a
region where alternative employment oppor-
tunities exist and where new plant capacity
must be installed before production can ex-
pand. A corollary of this is that the greater
variability of the declining region will be ob-
served in very short-run periods. The same
relation may hold for seasonal fluctuations.
Of course, the kind of industries a region
has largely determines the region's cyclical
characteristics. The cyclical variability attrib-
utable to industrial composition can be isolated
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and eliminated by standardizing the cyclical
variability of each state industry at the level
of its national counterpart. By this method, a
corrected state amplitude of aggregate em-
ployment presumably due to regional charac-
teristics can be obtained.
The importance of industrial composition in
accounting for state differences in the cyclical
swings in employment is seen if one ranks the
thirty-threestates according to actual and
hypothetical cyclical amplitudes. The Spear-
man coefficient of rank correlation is shown









The size of a state also appears to have a
strong influence on the corrected state ampli-
tude. For example, in the 1948-1950-1953
cycle, the coefficient of rank correlation be-
tween size (average number of manufactur-
ing employees during the period) and cor-
rected amplitude is —0.41. The influence of
size remains even if the states are stratified
into size and growth classes.
Why should the large states tend to be less
variable than the small? One hypothesis is that
the larger the unit of observation, the greater
the tendency for differences in the timing of
peaks and troughs in different sectors of the
state's economy to cancel out and reduce the
amplitudeofcyclicalfluctuationintotal
employment.
One can test this hypothesis by examining
the degree to which small states tend to exhibit
more uniform timing patterns among their
component industries than the large states do.
Or one can group the more homogeneous small
states into larger units of observation and de-
termine the effect on cyclical amplitude. These
computations are now being carried forward
for the 1948-1950-1953 cycle. For this pe-
riod, industrial employment data on a monthlybasis are published by the employment secur-
ity agencies of each state.
The long-term trend in a state appears to
have the expected influence on the corrected
state amplitude.For the 1948-1950-1953
cycle, the rank correlation between corrected
amplitude and growth is —0.35. In this cycle,
therefore, the states with the more rapid long-
term growth rates experienced smaller cyclical
swings. In addition, analysis of variance tests
indicate that growth has a significant influ-
ence on variability within size classes.
I am continuing this analysis on the relation
between size, growth, and variability for the
other three business cycles mentioned above.
A brief report indicating how the analysis ap-
plies to a single state was published in the
Review of New Jersey Business, January 1956,




Five studies were published during 1955 and
early 1956:
Personal Income during Business Cycles, by Dan-
iel Creamer
Consumption and Business Fluctuations: A Case
Study of the Shoe, Leather, Hide Sequence,
by Ruth P. Mack
Short-Term Economic Forecasting, Studies in In-
come and Wealth, Volume Seventeen
Policies to Combat Depression, Special Confer-
ence Series 7
The Korean War and United States Economic
Activity, 1950-1 952, Occasional Paper 49, by
Bert G. Hickman
Two books are in press:
A Theory of the Consumption Function, by Mil-
ton Friedman
Measurement and Behavior of Unemployment,
Special Conference Series 8
The monograph by Oskar Morgenstern,
"InternationalFinancialTransactionsand
Business Cycles," will shortly be ready for re-
view by the Board.Other manuscripts in
preparation are "Harvest Cycles," by Geoffrey
H. Moore, and "Cyclical Behavior of Federal
Receipts and Expenditures since 1879," by
John Firestone.
An exploratory study of the quality of credit
in booms and depressions is reported in Sec-
tion 4; Ilse Mintz reports on her study of
cycles in foreign trade in Section 6.




The results of this study of long-term trends
and future prospects, initiated in 1950 with the
aid of a grant from the Life Insurance Asso-
ciation of America, are being issued in a series
of monographs and briefer papers as well as
in a summary volume. The reports published
to date are:
The Role of Federal Credit Aids in Residential
Construction, Occasional Paper 39, by Leo
Grebler
The Volume of Residential Construction, 1889-
1950, Technical Paper 9, by David M. Blank
Capital and Output Trends in Manufacturing in-
dustries, 1880-1948, Occasional Paper 41, by
Daniel Creamer
The Share of Financial Intermediaries in Nation-
al Wealth and National Assets, 1900-1949,
Occasional Paper 42, by Raymond W. Gold-
smith
Trends and Cycles inCapital Formation by
United States Railroads, 1870-1950, Occasion-
al Paper 43, by Melville J. Ulmer
The Growth of Physical Capital in Agriculture,
1870-1 950, Occasional Paper 44, by Alvin S.
Tostlebe
Capital and Output Trends in Mining Industries,
1870-1948, Occasional Paper 45, by Israel
Borenstein
"Proportion of CapitalFormation to National
Products," by Simon Kuznets, American Eco-
nomic Association Proceedings, May 1952
"Factors in the Demand for Capital Funds," by
Simon Kuznets, Investment of Life Insurance
Funds, edited by David McCahan, University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1953
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